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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
statement concerning plaintiff's ability to pass good title should have
been evidence of malice sufficient to take the case to the jury.' 0
FRANKLIN T. DuPREE, JR.
Usury-Affirmative Relief for the Debtor.
In spite of the anomalous situation which results from such a decision,
and the questionable policy motivating it, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina seems determined to follow its line of cases which deny the
debtor party to a usurious contract affirmative relief of an equitable
nature.' In two cases decided this year,2 the creditor has brought action
to foreclose a deed of trust. The debtor has set up usury in his answer,
and prayed for injunctive relief. In both cases, defendant's prayer has
been denied on the tenuous and abstract ground that he has asked equity
and must therefore do equity-in other words, pay the principal plus
legal interest.3 Had the debtor restricted himself to purely legal defenses and remedies, he would have been required to pay no interest,
and could have recovered back double the amount of any interest already
paid. 4 Or, had he accompanied his prayer for an injunction with a
tender of principal and legal interest, presumably he could have had the
injunction, and saved his property from sale on foreclosure.5 But, having chosen neither of these alternatives, he was not only denied the
equitable relief which he asked, but, for the mere asking, was penalized
"- It will be noticed that malice in this connection is not used "in the sense of
actual ill-will to the plaintiff, but in the sense of an act done to the apparent damage of another without legal excuse." Morgan v. Smith, 77 N. C. 37 (1877)
(action for enticing away servants). This view finds support in other jurisdictons. Employing Printers Club v. Dr. Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S. E. 353
(1905); Quinlivian v. Brown Oil Co., 96 Mont. 147, 29 Pac. (2d) 374 (1934);
Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920).
'For a discussion of this situation, see Comment (1934) 12 N. C. L. Ray.
279. See also Waters v. Garris, 188 N. C. 305, 124 S. E. 334 (1924).
'Thomason v. Swenson, 207 N. C. 519, 177 S.E.647 (1935) ; and C. D. Kenny
Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., 208 N. C. 295, 180 S.E. 697 (1935). In the latter case,
receivers had been appointed for the debtor. The petition for foreclosure was
filed in the receivership proceeding. The other creditors and the receivers answered, praying for the injunction (among other things). The sale was ordered
and confirmed, and the lower court decreed that the petitioner was entitled to
principal plus six per cent interest. The receivers' appeal was dismissed on other
grounds, while the decree was affirmed on the creditors' appeal. The Court treats
the case as if only the debtor were the defendant.
The still more recent case of Ghormley v. Hyatt, 208 N. C. 478 (1935) incidentally reaffirms the rule, at p. 482.
3Yet note the Court's language in C. D. Kenny Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., 208
N. C. 295, 298. 180 S. E. 697, 698 (1935): "If this was an action in which
[petitioner creditor] . . . was seeking to recover of the defendant [debtor] . ..
the amount due on his bond .... he would be liable for the statutory penalties for
usury."
I N. C. CoDE (1935) §2306, and annotations thereto. Also note 3 supra.
'Jonas v. Home Mortgage Co., 205 N. C. 89, 170 S. E. 127 (1933) semble.
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to the extent of entitling the creditor to principal and legal interest out
of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. It would seem that, if "equity"
is to govern, he should have either the relief which he asks or the benefit
of the usury statute. There can be no equity in denying him both simply because he seeks equity.
Such a decision virtually repeals the usury statute in certain cases,
and creates a troublesome and unnecessary inconsistency in the North
Carolina law, as pointed out in an earlier issue of this publication.6 The
inconsistency is further illustrated by the established rule in this state
that, when a junior incumbrancer goes into equity to require assignment
to him of a usurious senior incumbrance, he is forced to pay only the
principal, without interest. 7 Thus the debtor, for whose benefit the
usury statute was intended, must "do equity" and pay legal interest if
he asks for equity; but a stranger to the usurious contract can have the
8
full benefit of the statute-in equity.
If the Court were convinced of the advisability of overruling those
cases which require the debtor who seeks equity to pay legal interest-a
rule which was born under quite different conditions 9-there would seem
to be no obstacle in its way. The doctrine of stare decisis should not be
permitted to impede wholesome judicial reform in the law. 10 There are
no vested rights in judicial decisions," and certainly usurious creditors
have no vested right to be free from that particular type of relief to
their debtors.
However, if the Court feels bound by its earlier decisions, there
should be no hesitation by the legislature to so amend the statute as to
give debtors the full protection which the policy behind usury statutes
2
dictates.1
D. W. MARKHAM.
Comment (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 279, supra note 1
See a criticism of the rule in Annotation III A to N. C. CoDE (1935) §2306.
Contrast the results of the rule with the following typical language of the
Court: "The charging and accepting of illegal interest has always been looked
upon by the courts with disfavor. Usury is a source of untold wrong and oppression" [Ghormley v. Hyatt, 208 N. C. 478, 484 (1935)].
Sherrill v. Hood, 208 N. C. 472 (1935).
8
Cf. C. D. Kenny Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., 208 N. C. 295, 180 S. E. 697 (1935),
supra note 2.
'See Comment (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 279, 280.
0

" Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort (1924) 37 H.Av.
L. R-v.409; Sims, The Problem of Stare Decisis in the Refori of the Law

(1930) 36 PA. B. A. RP. 170.
'See Iowa v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 516, 126 N. W. 454, 455 (1910).
' See the suggested amendment, Comment (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 279, 281.

